Informal Code of Police Deviancy:  A Group Approach to Blue-Coat Crime by Stoddard, Ellwyn R.
Journal of Criminal Law and Criminology
Volume 59 | Issue 2 Article 5
1968
Informal Code of Police Deviancy: A Group
Approach to Blue-Coat Crime
Ellwyn R. Stoddard
Follow this and additional works at: https://scholarlycommons.law.northwestern.edu/jclc
Part of the Criminal Law Commons, Criminology Commons, and the Criminology and Criminal
Justice Commons
This Article is brought to you for free and open access by Northwestern University School of Law Scholarly Commons. It has been accepted for
inclusion in Journal of Criminal Law and Criminology by an authorized editor of Northwestern University School of Law Scholarly Commons.
Recommended Citation
Ellwyn R. Stoddard, Informal Code of Police Deviancy: A Group Approach to Blue-Coat Crime, 59 J. Crim. L. Criminology & Police
Sci. 201 (1968)
THE JOURNAL or CRIM NAL LAw, CRINeOLOGY AND POLICE SCIENCE
Copyright @ 1968 by Northwestern University School of Law
Vol. 59, No. 2
Printed in U.S.A.
THE INFORMAL "CODE" OF POLICE DEVIANCY: A GROUP APPROACH TO
"BLUE-COAT CRIME"*
ELLWYN R. STODDARD
The author is Associate Professor of Sociology, University of Texas at El Paso.
The traditional stereotype of a policeman engaged in unlawful activity is usually that of an isolated
deviation by an individtal officer--morally weak, intellectually dull, and personally corrupt. The
study reported in this paper deals with police group deviation and the informal "code" whereby it is
perpetuated.
The author explores the process of recruit socialization into unlawful "code" practices, preserva-
tion of "code" secrecy; and group acceptance for practitioners is clearly documented. Difficulties in
breaking the "code" without destroying police professionalism are discussed.
It has been asserted by various writers of
criminology, deviant behavior, and police science
that unlawful activity by a policeman is a mani-
festation of personal moral weakness, a symptom
of personality defects, or the recruitment of
individuals unqualified for police work. In contrast
to the traditional orientation, this paper is a
sociological examination of "blue-coat crime"' as
a functioning informal social system whose norms
and practices are at variance with legal statutes.
Within the police group itself, this pattern of
illicit behavior is referred to as the "code".
Following an examination of these contrasting
viewpoints, this case study will provide data to
ascertain the existence of the "code", its limita-
tions and range of deviancy, and the processes
through which it is maintained and sanctioned
within the group. The guiding hypothesis of this
study is that illegal practices of police personnel
are socially prescribed and patterned through the
informal "code" rather than being a function of
* Revision of a paper presented at the Rocky Moun-
tain Social Science Association, Air Force Academy,
April, 1967. It was supported in part by a grant from
the University Research Institute, University of Texas
at El Paso.
IThis concept is a restricted modification of Suther-
land's term "White Collar Crime." Edwin H. Suther-
land, White Collar Criminality, 5 AMER. Soc. Rv. 1-12
(1940). However, the stress of Sutherland's thesis is
the lowering of social morale of the larger society by the
violation of trust by those holding these social positions.
The present emphasis is upon the group participating
in those violations and their reactions, morale and be-
havior, rather than the consequences accruing the
larger society as a result of these illegal actions. The
same violation of trust might produce a degree of
disorganization and lowering of morale among non-
participants, while producing a heightened morale and
cohesion among all of those in the norm-violating clique.
individual aberration or ,personal inadequacies of
the policeman himself.
THE INDIvIDUALISTIC APPROACH
Three decades ago August Vollmer emphasized
that the individual being suited to police work was
the factor responsible for subsequent deviancy
among officers. This approach implicitly assumes
inherent personality characteristics to be the
determinant which makes a police recruit into a
good officer or a bad one.2 A current text of police
personnel management by German reaffirms the
individualistic orientation of Vollmer, and suggests
that the quality of police service is ultimately
dependent upon the individual police officer.
There is no evidence of an awareness of group
pressures within his analysis.
3
A modified version of this individualistic
approach is the view that perhaps the individual
chosen had already become "contaminated" prior
to being hired as a member of the force, and when
presented with chances for bribery or favoritism,
the "hard core guy, the one who is a thief already,
steps in".4
2 AUGUST VOLLMER, THE PoLIcE AND MODERN
SocrETY 3-4 (1936).
3 A. C. GERMAN, POLICE PERSONNEL MANAGEMENT
3-4 (1958).4 Mort Stem, What Makes a Policeman Go Wrong?
An Ex-Member of the Force Traces the Steps on Way from
Law Enforcement to Violating, by a Former Denver
Police Officer as told to Mort Stem, Denver Post,
October 1, 1961. Reprinted in 53 J. Caxs. L., C. &
P. S. 97-101 (1962).
A similar reaction is given by James F. Johnson, a
former state trooper, Secret Service Agent, security
officer and private investigator in World Telegram and
Sun, March 10, 1953, quoted in TAPPAN, Cram,
jusncE ANm CoRtcxToN 290 (1960).
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A third factor, stressed by Tappan,5 is the poor
screening method at the recruitment stage. Such
an officer might have had inadequate training, in-,
sufficient supervision, and poor pay and is ripe
for any opportunity to participate in lucrative
illicit enterprises. This author then goes into
great detail to show the low intelligence and edu-
cational level of police officers. Another author
adds that improved selection and personality
evaluation have improved the quality of the
police considerably over the past 20 years, 6
thereby attacking this problem directly. One
recent author wrote that low salaries make more
difficult the attraction of applicants with the
moral strength to withstand temptations of
"handouts" and eventual corruption.7 Sutherland
and Cressey, although aware that graft is a
characteristic of the entire police system rather
than of isolated patrolman, stress the unqualified
appointments of police officials by corrupt poli-
ticians as the source of police deviancy. They
state:
Another consequence of the fact that police
departments often are organized for the
welfare of corrupt politicians, rather than of
society, is inefficient and unqualified personnel.
This is unquestionably linked with police
dishonesty, since only police officers who are
"right" can be employed by those in politi-
cal control. Persons of low intelligence and
with criminal records sometimes are em-
ployed. 9
THE GRouP APPROACH
In contrast to the individualistic approach of
these foregoing authors, the emphasis on the
social context in which police deviancy flourishes
has preoccupied the sociological criminologists.
The present case study would clearly reflect this
latter orientation.
Barnes and Teeters mention police deviancy in
conjunction with organized syndicated crime.10
5TAPPAN, IBm. 309ff.
6 Wilson, Progress in Police Administration, 42 J.
CRim. L., C. & P. S. 141 (1951).7 JOHNSON, CRUa, CoRREcroN AN SOcIET 452
(1964).
8 The Lexow Committee in New York (1894-1895),
and the Seabury Committee a generation later found
the same situation of departmental corruption quoted
in SUTHERLAN) & CREssz-Y, PRINCIPLES OF CxRDm'OL-
OGY 338 (6th ed. 1960).
9 SUrERLAN & CREssEY, IBM.
10 BARNEs & TEMTERs, NEW HoRIzoNs IN CRmIM-
NOLOGY 245-247 (2d ed. 1958).
Kom and McCorkle,n Cloward s and Merton'
see political and police corruption as a natural
consequence of societal demands for illegal serv-
ices. When these desired services are not provided
through legal structures, they are attained through
illegal means. However, documentation in support
of these theoretical explanations is sketchy and
limited in scope. Bell suggests that "crime is an
American way of life." In the American temper
there exists a feeling that "somewhere, somebody
is pulling all the complicated strings to which this
jumbled world dances". Stereotypes of big crime
syndicates project the feeling that laws are just
for "the little guys". Consequently, while "Ameri-
cans have made such things as gambling illegal,
they don't really in their hearts think of it as
wicked".' 4 Likewise, the routine discovery of an
average citizen in overt unlawful activity rarely
inflames the public conscience to the degree that it
does when this same deviant behavior is exhibited
by a police officer. Thus, the societal double
standard demands that those in positions of trust
must exhibit an artificially high standard of mo-
rality which is not required of the average citi-
zen.
A measure of role ambivalence is an inevitable
part of the policeman occupation in a democratic
society. While he is responsible to protect the
members of his society from those who would do
them harm, the corresponding powers for carrying
out this mandate are not delegated." To perform
his designated duties, the consciencious policeman
often must violate the very laws he is trying to
enforce. This poses a serious dilemma for the
police officer since his attempt to effectively dis-
courage violation of the law among the general
public is often hinged to extra-legal short-cut
techniques 6 which are in common practice by his
n KoRN & McCoRKU, CRIMINOLOGY AND PENOLOGY
85-86, 125-136 (1959).
12 Richard A. Cloward, Illegitimate Means, Anomie,
and Deviant Behavior, 24 AMER. Soc. REv. 167 (1959).
1" MERTON, SOCIAL THEORY AND SOCIAL STRUCTURE,
Chaps. 1, 4 and 5 (Revised and enlarged ed. 1958).
11 Bell, Crine as an American Way of Life, 13 ANTIOCH
REv. 140-144 (1953).
"SunERLuAmN & CREssEY, op. crT. 331.
'6 This dilemma is presently being compounded by
recent Supreme Court decisions involving police powers
and personal civil rights. The fear of an emergent police
state (which may or may not be valid) leads the present
Justices to feel that freedom of the individual will
result when police powers no longer encroach upon
individual rights. The paradox is that the police are
required to fulfill their traditional protection duties in
spite of these new formal procedures designed to limit
their investigative activities. To fulfill the social expec-
[Vol. 59
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law enforcement cohorts. For example, the use of
"illegal" violence by policeman is justified by them
as a necessary means to locate and harrass the
most vicious criminals and the Organized Syndi-
cates' 7 These procedures are reinforced through
coordinated group action.
The officer needs the support of his fellow
officers in dangerous situations and when he
resorts to practices of questionable legality.
Therefore, the rookie must pass the test of loy-
alty to the code of secrecy. Sometimes this loy-
alty of colleagues has the effect of protecting
the law-violating, unethical offlicer."
Such illegal practices which are traditionally
used to carry out a policeman's assigned tasks
might well be readily converted to the aims of
personal gain.
In these tight informal cliques within the larger
police force, certain "exploratory gestures"' 9 in-
volving the acceptance of small bribes and favors
can occur. This is a hazy boundary between
grateful citizens paying their respects to a proud
profession, and "good" citizens involved in cor-
ruption wishing to buy future favors. Once begun,
however, these practices can become "norms" or
informal standards of cliques of policemen. A new
recruit can be socialized into accepting these
illegal practices by mild, informal negative sanc-
tions such as the withholding of group acceptance.
If these unlawful practices are embraced, the
recruits membership group-the police force-and
his reference group-the clique involved in illegal
behavior-are no longer one and the same. In such
circumstances the norms of the reference group
(the illegal-oriented clique) would clearly take
precedence over either the formal requisites of the
membership group (police department regulations)
or the formalized norms (legal statutes) of the
larger society.'0 When such conflicts are apparent
a person can
tations of "catching criminals, dope peddlers, etc.,'
the policeman must adopt certain extra-legal procedures
strictly on an informal basis, while appearing on the
surface to be adhering to the formal limitations imposed
upon him. See Arthur Niederhoffer's recent monograph
Behind the Shidd: The Police in Urban Society (1967).
17 Westley, Violence and the Police, 59 AmER. J. Soc.
34-41 (1953).
18 Westley, Secrecy and the Police, 34 SocIAL FORCEs
254-257 (1956).
19 This concept was taken from Cornel, DEUINQIENT
Boys: Ta CuIurt or THE GANG 60 (1955).
20 SHRir & SHEmip, AN OuTm oF SocIAL Psy-
cHoLoGY 630-631, 638. For a sophisticated treatment
of reference group theory see Chapters 4, 16, and 18.
(Revised ed. 1956).
1) conform to one, take the consequences of
non-conformity to the other. 2) He can seek a
compromise position by which he attempts to
conform in part, though not wholly, to one or
more sets of role expectations, in the hope that
sanctions applied will be minimal.1
If these reference group norms involving illegal
activity become routinized with use they become
an identifiable informal "code" such as that found
in the present study. Such codes are not unique to
the police profession. A fully documented case
study of training at a military academy"' in which
an informal pattern of behavior was assimilated
along with the formal standards dearly outlined
the function of the informal norms, their domi-
nance when in conflict with formal regulations, and
the secretive nature of their existence to facilitate
their effectiveness and subsequent preservation.
The revelation of their existence to those outside
the cadet group would destroy their integrative
force and neutralize their utility.
This same secrecy would be demanded of a
police "code" to insure its preservation. Although
within the clique the code must be well defined,
the ignorance of the lay public to even its existence
would be a requisite to its continuous and effective
use." Through participation in activity regi-
mented by the "code" an increased group identity
and cohesion among "code" practitioners would
emerge.
Group identity requires winning of accep-
tance as a member of the inner group and,
thereby, gaining access to the secrets of the oc-
cupation which are acquired through informal
contacts with colleagues."
Lack of this acceptance not only bars the neophyte
from the inner secrets of the profession, but may
isolate him socially and professionally from his
colleagues and even his superiors. There is the
added fear that, in some circumstance in which he
would need their support, they would avoid be-
coming involved, forcing him to face personal
danger or public ridicule alone.
The social structure in which law enforcement
is maintained has a definite bearing on what is
21 Stouffer, An Analysis of Conflicting Social Norms,
14 Awza. Soc. REv. 707 (1949).
22 Dornbush, The Military Academy as an Assimilat-
ing Institution, 33 SocIAL FORCES 316-321 (1955).
23 Moore & Tumin, Some Social Functions of Igno-
rance, 14 AxmR. Soc. REv. 791 (1949).
24 JonNsoN, or. crr. 445-446.
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considered normal and what is deviant behavior.
The pattern of "Blue-Coat Crime" (i.e., the
"code") seems far more deviant when compared
to the dominant middle-class norms of our society
as when compared to lower class values. Whyte
maintains that in the Italian Slum of Cornerville,
the primary function of the police department is
not the enforcement of the law, but the regulation
of illegal activities...
... an outbreak of violence arouses the
"good people" to make demands for law en-
forcement... even when they disturb police
racketeer relations. Therefore, it is in the in-
terest of the departments to help maintain a
peaceful racket organization ... By regula-
ting the racket and keeping peace, the officer
can satisfy the demands for law enforcement
with a number of token arrests and be free to
make his adjustment to the local situation
25
Since an adjustment to the local situation might
well involve adopting some of the "code" prac-
tices, the successful police rookie is he who can
delicately temper three sets of uncomplementary
standards: 1) the "code" practices adopted for
group acceptance, 2) the societal standards regu-
lating the duties and responsibilities of the police
profession and 3) his own system of morality
gained from prior socialization in family, religious,
educational and peer-group interaction.
Mettwdological Considerations:
The difficulties connected with any intensive
investigation into the "code" are self evident. The
binding secrecy which provides the source of its
power would be disrupted if the "code" were
revealed to an "outsider". Thus, standard sociolog-
ical research methods were ineffective in this type
of investigation. The traditional ethnographic
technique of using an informant familiar with the
"code" and its related practices made available
the empirical data within this study. Obviously,
data from a single informant do not begin to meet
the stringent scientific criteria of reliability for
25 WnyTE, STREET CORNER SOCIETY 138-139 (En-
larged ed. 1955).
Another author conceptualized this problem by
delineating it as two separate police functions. "Law
enforcement" has specific formal legal procedures
whereas "keeping the peace" is vague and without a
clear-cut mandate. This study updates by three decades
the classic work of Whyte. See Egon Bittner, The Police
on Skid-Row: A Study of Peace Keeping, 32 AiMR. Soc.
REv. 699-715 (1967).
the purpose of applying the conclusions from this
case to police agencies in general. It is assumed
that subsequent research will establish whether
this is a unique episode or more of a universal
phenomenon. However, the decision to enrich the
literature with this present study in spite of its
methodological deficiencies was felt to be justified
inasmuch as an intensive search through the
professional literature revealed no empiricial
accounts dealing directly with deviant police-
men. 26
Because of the explosive nature of such materi-
als on the social, political and economic life of the
persons involved, the use of pseudonyms to main-
tain complete anonymity is a precaution not
without precedent, and was a guarantee given by
the director of this study in return for complete
cooperation of the informant.27 The informant was
a police officer for 3y2 years before he was impli-
cated in charges of Robbery and Grand Larceny.
He was subsequently tried and convicted, serving
the better part of a year in prison. At the time of
these interviews, he had been released from prison
about three years.
The initial design of this study attempted to
correlate these empirical data with two journalistic
accountsw but the subjective handling of those
stories neutralized any advantage gained from an
increased number of informants. The present
design is based exclusively on the single inform-
ant.
The Code and Its Practices:
Some of these terms used to describe police
26 Many authors have written of police deviancy as
tangential to their central theme. However, persistent
search failed to reveal recent empirical studies focusing
directly on the deviant policeman himself. Most ap-
plicable were Westley's, Violence and the Police, op.
cir., and Secrecy and the Police, op. crr., although even
here the data were gained from policemen still "in
favor," who might well have reservations about reveal-
ing the full extent to which the "Code" was practiced.
2 A graduate assistant from the Department of
Sociology, Mr. Ivy L. Gilbert approached ex-officer
"Smith" as a friend, and under guidance of the present
author was able to gain "Smith's" cooperation for a
scientific study. Taped interviews over a period of
several months were recorded and transcribed by
Gilbert. Many of these materials were used in Gilbert's
Master's Thesis, A CAsE STUiDY or PoLIcE ScA2WAL:
AN INVESTIGATION INTO ILLEGITIuATE Noniss oF A
LEGrrimATE ENFORCEMENT AGENCY (June, 1965).
28 One article is a composite of personal experience as
a police reporter, David G. Wittles, Why Cops Turn
Crooked, Saturday Evening Post, April 23, 1949, p. 26ff;
the other is an account of a former Denver policeman




deviancy are widely used, but because of possible
variations in meaning they are defined below.A
These practices are ordered so that those listed
first would generally elicit the least fear of legal
prosecution and those listed last would invoke
major legal sanctions for their perpetration.
Mooching-An act of receiving free coffee, cig-
arettes, meals, liquor, groceries, or other
items either as a consequence of being in an
underpaid, undercompensated profession or
for the possible future acts of favoritism
which might be received by the donor.
Chiseling-An activity involving police de-
mands for free admission to entertainment
whether connected to police duty or not,
price discounts, etc.
Favoritism-The practice of using license tabs,
window, stickers or courtesy cards to gain
immunity from traffic arrest or citation
(sometimes extended to wives, families and
friends of recipient).
Prejudice-Situations in which minority
groups receive less than impartial, neutral,
objective attention, especially those who are
less likely to have "influence" in City Hall
to cause the arresting officer trouble.
Shopping-The practice of picking up small
items such as candy bars, gum, or cigarettes
at. a store where the door has been acci-
dentally unlocked after business hours.
Extortion-The demands made for advertise-
ments in police magazines or purchase of
tickets to police functions, or the "street
courts" where minor traffic tickets can be
avoided by the payment of cash bail to the
arresting officer with no receipt required.
Bribery-The payments of cash or "gifts" for
past or future assistance to avoid prosecu-
tion; such reciprocity might be made in
terms of being unable to make a positive
identification of a criminal, or being in the
wrong place at a given time when a crime is
to occur, both of which might be excused as
carelessness but no proof as to deliberate
miscarriage of justice. Differs from mooch-
ing in the higher value of a gift and in the
mutual understanding regarding services to
be performed upon the acceptance of the
gift.
29 The majority of these terms and definitions are
modified from those listed by Gilbert, op. cit. 34, and
discussed by GERMA, Op. crr. supra note 3 at p. 173.
Shakedown-The practice of appropriating ex-
pensive items for personal use and attribu-
ting it to criminal activity when investiga-
ting a break in, burglary, or an unlocked
door. Differs from shopping in the cost of
the items and the ease by which former
ownership of items can be determined if the
officer is "caught" in the act of procure-
ment.
Perjury-The sanction of the "code" which
demands that fellow officers lie to provide an
alibi for fellow officers apprehended in un-
lawful activity covered by the "code."
Pre-meditated Theft-Planned burglary, in-
volving the use of tools, keys, etc. to gain
forced entry or a pre-arranged plan of un-
lawful acquisition of property which can-
not be explained as a "spur of the moment"
theft. Differs from shakedown only in the
previous arrangements surrounding the
theft, not in the value of the items taken.
Mooching, chiseling, favoritism and pre idice do
not have rigid interpretations in the "code". Their
presence appears to be accepted by the general
public as a real fact of life. Since the employment
of one of these practices can be done while in the
normal routine of one's duties, such practices are
often ignored as being "deviant" in any way. Ex-
Officer Smith sees it in this light:
... the policeman having a free cup of coffee?
I have never thought of this as being corrupt
or illegal because this thing is just a courtesy
thing. A cup of coffee or the old one-the cop
on the beat grabbing the apple off the cart-
these things I don't think shock too many peo-
ple because they know that they're pretty well
accepted.
But when asked about the practice of mooching by
name, it assumed a different character of increased
importance to Smith!
I think mooching is accepted by the police
and the public is aware of it. My opinion
now, as an ex-policeman, is that mooching is
one of the underlying factors in the larger
problems that come.., it is one of the most
basic things. It's the easiest thing to accept
and to take in stride because it's so petty. I
think that it is the turning point a lot of times.
The "Sunday Comics" sterotype of policeman
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initiating mooching, bribery and favoritism is in-
correct according to Smith's experience:
Generally, the policeman doesn't have to
ask for things, he just finds out about them.
Take for example the theaters. I know the
Roxy theaters would let the policeman in on
his badge, just about anytime. It's good busi-
ness because it puts the owner in a closer rela-
tionship with the policeman, and the police-
man is obligated to him. If they had a break-
in, a fire, or a little favor such as double park-
ing out front to unload something, they'd ex-
pect special consideration from the policeman.
When I walked the east side beat the nor-
mal thing was for bartenders to greet me and
offer me a pack of cigarettes or a drink. When I
walked the beat I was pretty straight laced,
there were a few bartenders that I felt were
just trying to get along with me, and I loosened
up a little with those people. One bartender
gave me cigars when he found out that I didn't
smoke cigarettes. I always accepted them; he
always pointed out there wasn't any obliga-
tion. Some of the beat men accepted cigarettes,
some cigars, some took cash, and these men
know when they're dealing with bootleggers,
and why they're being paid. Different busi-
nessmen in the loop area give policemen
Christmas presents every year.
Shopping and shakedown, extortion and bribery
are all dearly unlawful, but in these practices the
manner in which they are carried out contains a
measure of safety to the policeman should his
presence or behavior be questioned. A policeman's
investigative powers allows him entry into an open
building in which a "suspected robbery" has
occurred, and various types of articles such as ciga-
rettes and the like cannot be traced to any given
retail outlet. Hence, his presence on such occasions
is not suspected; rather, it is expected! Also, should
a clumsy job of shopping or shakedown result in
witnesses reporting these unlawful practices, the
"code" requires that participating officers must
commit perjury to furnish an alibi for those col-
leagues observed in illegal activities. This is both
for the protection of the deviant officer and to
preclude public disclosure of the widespread in-
volvement of fellow officers in "code" practices.
How extensive is shopping and shakedown as prac-
ticed by a department?
As far as the Mid-City department is con-
cerned I would say that 10 percent of the de-
partment would go along with anything, in-
cluding deliberate forced entries or felonies.
But about 50 percent of then would openly go
along with just about anything. If they found
a place open or if there had been a break-in or
if they found anything they could use and it
was laying there, they'd help themselves to
it.
Whenever there's an open door or window,
they call for all the cars and they shake the
whole building down-loot it!
Would those policemen involved in shopping and
shakedown participate in something more serious?
According to ex-officer Smith, they would.
Most of the policemen who shop or go along
with shopping would go along with major
theft, if it just happened. I think where you've
got to draw the line is when you get into pre-
meditated, deliberate thefts. I think this is
where the big division comes.
In shopping, the theft just happens. Pre-
meditated theft is a cold, deliberate, planned
thing.
Here Smith points out the limits of the "code"
which, through condoning any level of theft that
"just happens," cannot fully support premeditated
theft.
I think in premeditated theft that the gen-
eral police attitude is against it, if for no other
reason just for the matter of self-preservation,
and survival. When you get to a premeditated,
deliberate thing, then I think your police back-
ing becomes pretty thin.
At the time when Smith was engaged in the prac-
tice of pre-meditated theft in Mid-City, it looked
somewhat differently to him than it did later.
When he took an objective look, he was aware of
just how little this extreme deviancy actually was
practiced.
When I was involved in it, it seemed like all
the people around me were involved in it, and
participating in it. It looked more to me like
the generally accepted thing then, than it does
now, because actually the clique that I was in
that did this sort of thing was a small one.
I'm not discounting the fact that there may
(Vol. 59
"BLUE-COAT" CRIME
have been a lot of other small cliques just like
this.
Looking at his behavior as an outsider, after his
expulsion, Smith saw it in this light:
After taking a long, hard look at my case and
being real honest about it, I'd have to say that
this [Pre-meditated theft like mine] is the ex-
ception. The longer I'm away from this thing
the more it looks like this.
In Mid-City, extortion was not generally prac-
ticed and the "code" prescribed "street courts"
(i.e., bribery for minor traffic offenses) as outside
the acceptable pattern.
[Extortion is] something that I would clas-
ify as completely outside the law [here in Mid-
City], something that in certain areas has been
accepted well on the side of both the public
and the police. There's a long standing prac-
tice that in Chicago if you are stopped for a
traffic violation if you had a five dollar bill
slipped in your plastic holder, or your billfold,
the patrolman then asks for your license, and
if that's in there you'll very rarely be issued a
summons. Now this thing was something that
was well known by truck-drivers and people
who travel through that area.
Smith maintains that the "code" is widespread,
although from the above analysis of extortion it
can be dearly seen that specific practices have been
traditionally practiced and accepted in certain
areas, yet not found acceptable in another com-
munity. Would this mean that the bulk of these
"code" practices occur in police departments other
than the one in which Smith served his "appren-
ticeship" in "Blue-Coat Crime"? Our informant
says "yes" and offers the following to substantiate
his answer:
I think generally the Mid-City police de-
partment is like every police department in the
world. I think the exceptions are probably in
small towns or in a few cities that have never
been touched by corrupt politics, if there are
any. But I think that generally they are the
same everywhere,3 because I have talked to
30 Smith's evaluations are heavily influenced by his
experience. He was a patrolman in a police department
totaling about 250 personnel, serving a metropolitan
area of a quarter of a million persons.
However, other sources have suggested that when a
policemen from other cities. I know policemen
in other cities that I've had contact with that
were in those things. I've discussed open
things, or out and out felonies, with policemen
from Kansas City on. And I know that at least
in that city that it happens, and it's a matter
of record that it happens in Denver and Chi-
cago. And I think that this happens in all
cities.
From a scientific point of view, other than the in-
cidence of police scandals from time to time, there
is no evidence to confirm or deny this one ex-
officer's opinion regarding the universal existence
of the "code".
The Recruit's Initiation into the "Code" Clique:
Bucher describes a profession as a relatively
homogeneous community whose members share
identity, values, definitions of role, and interest.
Socialization of recruits consists of inducting them
into the "common core".3' This occurs on two lev-
els: the formal, or membership group, and the in-
formal, or the reference group.
In the Mid-City police department the failure
to socialize most of the new recruits into the
"code" would constitute a threat to those who
presently practice it. Thus, all "code" practi-
tioners have the responsibility of screening new
recruits at various times to determine whether
they are "airight guys", and to teach by example
and mutual involvement the limitations of "code"
practices. If the recruit accepts such training, he
is welcomed into the group and given the rights
and privileges commensurate with his new status.
If he does not, he is classified as a "goof" and
avoided by the rest.
In a journalistic account of police deviancy, it
was argued that if corruption exists in the political
structures controlling police department appoint-
ments, this "socialization" into deviancy begins
at the point of paying for the privilege of making
an application or of buying an appointment.
L n
community gets larger than 80,000 people, political
corruption and graft are inevitable. Wittels, op. cit., 26.
31 Rue Bucher and Anselm Strauss, Professions in
Progress, 64 A~ms. J. Soc. 325-326 (1961).
n One Policeman reported having paid $300.00 to
take the police examination. He also was required to
pledge his family's vote to the "right" party. After some
wait, he took a "special exam," then more waiting lists,
and a final $300.00 to the party fund was required
before he was hired. Then he had to purchase his own
uniform on contract at the "right" store. Before this
man became a member of the department, by his
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Although Smith did not "buy" his appointment,
he cited the existence of factions having influence
in recruit appointments, even within the structure
of a Civil Service Commision.
There are four different requirements to the
whole thing. One is your written test, one is
your agility, one is your physical examination,
and the fourth is the oral examination which is
given by the civil service commission. I really
crammed before I took the test. When I took
the test it was a natural for me, it was a snap.
I scored a 94 on my test for the police depart-
ment. With my soldiers preference, which
gives you 5 points, I scored a 99.3 I passed my
agility test and my physical. I could have had
a 100 score, I could have been a gymnast, gone
through the agility test and made everyone
else look silly and still I could have failed in
the oral exam. And this is the kicker where
politics comes in.
There are three old men that are aligned
with different factions, different people on and
off the department, different businessmen that
have power, different groups, different lodges
and organizations and all these things influ-
ence these men, these three people that make
up the civil service board.
The existence of the "code" had hurt the level of
morale generally in the Mid-City department. In
fact, the breakdown of each new recruit's morale
is an important step in gaining his acceptance of
the "code".
The thing that hurt the moral was the fact
that a large percentage of the people on the
department were involved in illegal practices
to some degree. And actually you take a man
that has just joined the department, has good
participation in the recruitment process, he was an
involved member practicing the "code". Wittels, op.
cit. 105-107, 111.
"In spite of Smith's remarkable test level, he was left
off a list of highest 10 eligible applicants, and some three
months later was put on the list through the influence
of his father, a respected member of the police depart-
ment with many years of unblemished service. Other-
wise, he may never have been placed on the appoint-
ment list.
This is not unlike the planned removal of old
civilian standards and values when a new soldier recruit
is given basic training. The formal regulations are
presented to him, but in company with "old Salts" he
learns how the system can be worked and what a person
must do to participate in it.
intentions35 and is basically honest, and in this,
to a man that's never been dishonest and
hasn't stepped over the line, there aren't de-
grees. It's all either black or white. And the il-
legal activity I know shocks a lot of these
young men.... because it was the thing to do.
It's a way to be accepted by the other people.
It's a terrible thing the way one policeman will
talk about another. Say an old timer will have
a new man working with him and he'll tell you,
"You've got to watch him, because he's
honest!"
For a recruit to be accepted in the Mid-City police
department he must accept the informal practices
occurring in the department. Illegal activity is
pursued within the police force as the dominant
"norm" or standard.
To illustrate the group pressure on each police-
men who dares to enforce the law as prescribed in
the legal statutes, the following account is typi-
cal.
We'll take a classic example-Mr. Sam Pai-
sano. Now when I was on the force I knew
that whenever I worked in the downtown
area, I could go into Sam's restaurant and
order my meal and never have to pay a dime. I
think that just about every patrolman on the
force knew that. If I had run across Sam doing
anything short of murder, I think I would have
treaded very lightly. Even if I hadn't accep-
ted his free meals. Say I had turned it down;
still, if I stopped this man for a minor traffic
violation, say I caught him dead to rights, I'd
be very reluctant to write this man a ticket be-
cause I'd suffer the wrath of the other men on
the force. I'd be goofing up their meal ticket.
Now he in turn knows this. The rest of the
officers wouldn't waste any words about it,
they'd tell you right off-"You sure fouled up
our meal ticket". The old timers would give
you a cold shoulder. If it came to the attention
of the gold braid, your immediate superiors,
they'd make sure you had a little extra duty
or something. In most cases if you did this just
to be honest, just to be right, it would go
badly for you.
"1 One writer corroborates this by stating that young
recruits who show traits of being ambitious, as well as
those with family responsibilities, are the most sus-
ceptible to graft. The pressures toward success and
achievement are clearly indicated by either or both of
these factors. Wittels, op. cit. 27.
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This special treatment of Mr. Paisano
wasn't something that you concealed, or that
you were ashamed of because it was the nor-
mal accepted thing to do. I'd have been more
ashamed, and I'd have kept it quiet if I'd
stopped such a man as this, because I'd have
felt like some kind of an oddball. I would have
been bucking the tide, I'd been out of step.
Yet, such general practices must be converted to
individual participation at some point, and to be
effective this involvement must be on a primary
group relationship basis. Smith's account of his
introduction to the "code" follows the first steps
of the assimilating process.
The first thing that I can recall seeing done
[which was illegal] was on the night shift when
I first went on patrol. The old timers were
shaking buildings down and helping them-
selves to whatever was in the building. The
first time I saw it happen I remember filing
through the check-out counter at a supermar-
ket, seeing all the officers grabbing their ciga-
rettes or candy bars, or whatever they wanted
and I passed through without anything.
I got in the car and this old timer had, of all
the petty things, two of these 25 or 30 cent
candy bars and he sat them down in the seat
and told me to have some. I told him I really
didn't want any. And he asked me if "that
shook me up" or something. And I told him,
"Well, it sort of surprised me". He said that
everybody did it and that I should get used to
that.
And as it went on it progressed more. Well,
in fact, he justified it at the time by telling me
he had seen the same market one time, when
there had been a legitimate break-in and one
particular detective had been so busy loading
the back seat of his car full of hams and big
pieces of beef that he was stumbling and fal-
ling down back and from the cooler to the al-
ley, and he didn't even know who was around
him he was so busy carrying things out. And
he named this officer and I don't doubt it be-
cause I've seen the same officer do things in
that same nature.
And this was the first direct contact I had
with anything like this.
The old timers would test the new recruits with
activities which could be laughed off if they were
reported, such as the 30 cent candy bar taken from
the supermarket in the above account.
The old timers would nose around 'til they
found out whether a young guy was going to
work with them and "be right" as far as they
were concerned, or whether he was going to re-
sist it and be straight as far as the rest of the
world was concerned.
If the recruit cooperated, the practices were
extended and the rookie became involved. Once
he was involved there was no "squealing" on fellow
policemen breaking the law. Then he could have
some personal choice as to how far he personally
wished to go. However, those who were straight-
laced and wanted to stay honest had their prob-
lems too. Social isolation appears to be a powerful
sanction as can be seen from Smith's informa-
tion.
There are a few policemen that are straight-
laced all the way. I can remember one police-
man who might have made an issue of another
policeman taking something. He had that atti-
tude for the first six months that he was on the
force but by that time, he had been brow
beaten so bad, he saw the writing on the wall.
He knew better than to tell anything. In addi-
tion to brow beating, this man in very short
order was put in a position where they had him
on the information desk, or kicked around
from one department to another, 'cause no-
body wanted to work with him. This kind of a
man they called "wormy," because anything
that would happen he'd run to the braid.
This fellow, I knew, wanted to be one of the
boys, but he wanted to be honest, too. As it
turned out, this guy was finally dismissed from
the force for having an affair with a woman in
his squad car. Just a couple of years before
that he would have had a fit if he thought that
somebody was going to take a drink on duty,
or fool around with a woman, or steal any-
thing. For this reason this man spent a lot of
time on the information desk, working inside,
and by himself in the squad car.
Negative sanctions were applied against "goofs"
who advocated following the legitimate police
ethic. Group acceptance by senior officers was the
reward to a recruit accepting the "code", and the
"code" was presented to the recruit as the police
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way of life having precedence over legal responsi-
bilities.
This small fraction that.., are honest and
would report illegal activity, are ostracized.
Nobody will work with them. They look at
them like they're a freak, talk about them
like they're a freak, and they are a freak.
The goofs that would talk about doing
things the way they should be done, they had
to be ignored or put down. There were older
policemen that as they found out I would go
along with certain things, pressed to see how
much further I would go. And showed me that
they went farther, whether I cared to or not.
So naturally I went along quite a ways with
some of them. And I don't really remember
how we frst became aware of how far the
other person would go. I think this is just a
gradual thing.
The existence of a social system of an informal
nature working quietly under the facade of the
formal police department regulations has been
dearly demonstrated in Mid-City. One further
note in explaining the motivations of policemen
toward illegal activities involves the condition of
low salaries. Smith's department pay scale and
working conditions would suggest that economic
pressures were a factor in condoning or rational-
zing "code" practices.
The pay wasn't good. I went on the depart-
ment and earned $292 a month. The morale of
the force was as low as that of any group that
I've ever been around. There was constant
complaining from all then about everything.
The training programs were set up so that
you would have to come in on your own time
and weren't compensated for it.... They dic-
tated to you how you lived your whole life,
not only what you did during the eight hours
you were a policeman but how you'd live your
whole life. This as much as anything hurt the
morale.
But when Smith was asked directly, "With the
policeman's low salary, do illegal activities become
necessary to keep up financially?" he discounted it
as a major factor.
36
36 To evaluate Smith's statement on economic pres-
sures, an additional personal datum is relevant. Smith
used most of his money from premeditated theft for his
I don't think this is the case. I don't think
there are very many policemen that I knew,
and I knew all of them, that were social
climbers or that tried to keep up with the
Jones, by illegal activities anyway.
Actually most of the police officers think
that they are even above those people that
have money, because they have power. Those
people with money are pretty well forced to
cater to a policeman. And you'll find that very
few people ever tell a policeman what they
think of him, whether they like him or not.
They know that a policeman will do him harm.
The businessmen, especially the bigger busi-
nessmen, pamper the policemen. They will
treat them with respect when they face them.
Sanctions for Preservation of the "Code":
Normally, practioners of the "code" would con-
sist of a united group working to protect all fellow
patrolmen from prosecution. However, Smith had
exceeded the "code" limitsn by committing pre-
meditated theft, and in order to protect the "code"
from being exposed during the scandal involving
Smith and two accomplices, the "clique" socially
and spatially isolated themselves from the three
accused policemen.
Everybody ran for cover, when the thing
hit the front page of the newspapers. I've
never seen panic like there was at that time.
These people were all ready to sell out their
mother to save their own butts. They knew
there was no holding back, that it was a tidal
wave. They were grabbing just anything to
hang on. The other policemen were ordered to
stay away from us, myself and the other men
involved. They were ordered to stay away
"habit"--a racing car. He later declared he probably
wouldn't have participated in this crime so much had
it not been for the "habit." His responses did not seem
to indicate that he began theft for racing money, but
that he continued it to counter the economic drain
created by owning and driving the racing machine.
One officer reports that he wondered why he was
not promoted-perhaps they thought he was lazy. He
was tagging cars of all violators, and even reported a
broken sidewalk belonging to an "organization" man.
He couldn't get ahead. He made a couple of outstanding
arrests and was made a detective. Later, he ran a
"vice" raid against a "protected" place, and was back
as a rookie on a beat in "Siberia." He finally took some
payoffs and cooperated and eventually became a Police
Captain, but exceeding the "Code" limits, was caught
and prosecuted. Either not accepting the "code", or




from the trials. They were tid to keep their
noses out of this thing, that it would be han-
dled.
There were a few policemen who came
around during this time. Strangely the ones
who came around were the ones who didn't go
in for any of the illegal activity. They didn't
have anything to worry about. Everybody
else ran and hid.
During a time like this, group consensus is required
to preserve the "code". A certain amount of ra-
tionalization is necessary to mollify past illicit ac-
tivity in light of present public exposure. Smith
continues:
I think if they had really gone by the book
during the police scandal, that 25 percent of
the policemen would have lost their jobs. I've
talked to some of them since, and the worst
violators all now have themselves convinced
that they weren't guilty of a thing.
I've never referred to myself as this before,
but I was their goat, their scapegoat. The
others stuck together and had support. I got
what I deserved, but if I compare myself with
the others, I got a real raw deal.
Preservation of the "code" occurs when police-
men work with another person who has similar in-
tentions and begin to "trust" one another in illegal
activities without fear of the authorities being in-
formed. A suggestion of rotating young officers
from shift to shift to weaken the "code" had been
given public discussion. To this, Smith reacted
thusly:
I think that the practice of rotating young
officers will serve a purpose. It will eliminate a
lot of things because you just can't take a
chance with somebody that you don't know.
If you don't know but what the next person
they throw you with might be a CID ... short
for Criminal Investigation Department.
They're spies! Say there are just 10 percent of
the men on the department that wouldn't go
along with anything, and they are switching
around with the new system, you don't know
when you're gong to catch one of them, and if
you do you're a cooked goose. The old system
you were 90 percent sure of the people you
were with.
This same process used to preserve the illegal
"code" as a group phenomenon is also the same
process used to develop and promote the acceptable
professional ethics of the police. A situation in
which it is "normal" for a policeman to "squeal on
his fellow patrolmen," would undermine profes-
sional ethics. Personal insecurity would mount
with the constant fear of just being accused with or
without supporting evidence. Such an anarchical
system lends itself to intrigue, suspicion and an in-
creased possibility of each officer being "framed."
Thus, these same procedures which would effec-
tively reduce the continuation of the "code"
would also prove dysfunctional to the mainte-
nance of the ethics which are the core of the police
profession itself. These concurrent processes reflect
the dual standards extant in society at large.
Difficulties Involved in Breaking the "Code":
If a "code" does exist in a law enforcement
agency, one of the major factors which protects it
from attack is secrecy. This factor is compounded
by public acceptance of the traditional view of
illegal behavior as only an individualistic, moral
problem.
Another shield of the "code" from attack is the
apathy resulting from the myriad of complex de-
mands and responsibilities placed upon the average
citizen. So many things touch him with which he
must become involved that he does not pursue
problems which do not directly concern him. In-
extricably connected with this is the realistic fear
of retaliation, either through direct harassment by
the police or indirectly through informal censures."
Smith says that only a real big issue will provoke
an apathetic public to action.
Everybody's looking out for number one. And
the policeman can do you harm. It's such a
complex thing, there are so many ways, so
many different people are affected by the po-
lice-Most people will back off. Most people
are afraid to do anything, if it looks like it's
going to affect them adversely.
If the police have carefully practiced preidice,
in their day-to-day operations, the chances are
"The campaigning attack on the "untouchable"
image of J. Edgar Hoover and the FBI has made
political news. The very act of exposing methods used
by Hoover's organization, which though admittedly
effective were clearly unlawful, caused the political
downfall of an otherwise popular politician in the
November 1966 Nevada election.
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slim that the persons against whom these illegal
practices were committed possess either the social
or political power to break the "code" before the
system could retaliate. Knowing this fact keeps
most of the persons with any knowledge of the
"code's" operation silent indeed.
The rigid procedures of obtaining legal evidence
and the dangers of committing a false arrest are
gigantic deterrents to bringing accusations against
any suspicious person, especially a policeman. Ex-
Officer Smith discusses the realistic problems in-
volved in attempting to eforce legal statutes
against shopping or other aspects of the "code":
I think that any law against shopping
would be hard to enforce against a police of-
ficer. You'd really have to have the evidence
against him and really make it public, cause it
would be soft pedalled all the way otherwise.
Let's say you see a police officer in a restaurant
taking a pack of cigarettes or let's say it's
something other than a pack of ciagrettes,
something that you can prove came from the
restaurant. And along comes a radio news unit
and you stop the unit and say you just saw a
policeman steal a pack of cigarettes or some-
thing bigger. When other police arrive on the
scene the newsman would probably pull the
other policemen off to the side and tell them
that their buddy just took a pack of cigarettes
and that goofball [the informer] wants to make
trouble about it. You insist that they shake
down the policeman and they find the item.
Here you're in pretty good shape. In this case
you'd have a policeman in a little bit of
trouble. I don't think he'd lose his job or do
any time over it, but I'd say there would be
some scandal about it. Unless you were real
hard headed they'd soft pedal it.
Let's back up a little and say the policeman
threw the item back into the restaurant, and
then you made your accusation. Then you're
in trouble, 'cause when they shake him down
and he doesn't have a thing. Now you're a
marked man, because every policeman in town
will know that you tried to foul up one of their
boys. Even the honest policemen aren't going
to like what you did. In other words, they are
tightly knit, and they police this city by fear to
a certain extent.
In Mid-City only those who are involved in
practicing the "code" are equipped with the nec-
essary information to expose its operations.
Whether one can inform on his fellow officers is
directly connected with the degree of his illegal in-
volvement prior to the situation involving the un-
lawful event.
It all depends upon how deeply you are in-
volved. If you've been a guy who has gone
along with a free cup of coffee, the gratuities,
the real petty things and you'd happen to
drive up on a major theft, drive up on another
policeman with his shoulder against the door,
then you might take action. However, if you
had gone a little farther, say you'd done some
shopping, then you're forced to look the other
way. It's like a spider spinning a web, you're
drawn in toward the center.
It appears obvious that those who are involved
in the "code" will be the least useful instruments
for alleviating the problem. Only the professionally
naive would expect a "code" practitioner to dis-
close the "code's" existence, much less reveal its
method of operation, since his own position is so
vulnerable.
SUMMARY oF FNDINGS
From data furnished by a participant informant,
an informal "code" of illegal activities within one
police department was documented. The group
processes which encouraged and maintained the
"code" were identified. It was found that the new
recruits were socialized into "code" participation
by "old timers" and group acceptance was with-
held from those who attempted to remain com-
pletely honest and not be implicated. When formal
police regulations were in conflict with "code"
demands among its practitioners, the latter took
precedence. Since the "code" operates under con-
ditions of secrecy, only those who participate in it
have access to evidence enough to reveal its method
of operation. By their very participation they are
implicated and this binds them to secrecy as well.
In this study the public indignation of a police
scandal temporarily suspended the "code" but it
flourished again when public apathy returned.
Although some individual factors must be con-
sidered in explaining police deviancy, in the present
study the sanction of group acceptance was para-
mount. This study dearly demonstrates the social
genesis of the "code", the breeding ground for in-
dividual unlawful behavior. From evidence con-
tained herein, an individualistic orientation to
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police deviancy may discover the "spoiled fruit"
but only when the "code" is rooted out can the
"seedbed" of deviancy be destroyed.
From related research in group deviancy, it can
be stated that the social organization of a given
community (including its respectable citizens) is
the milieu in which a "code" flourishes. Thus, a
police department is an integral element of that
complex community structure, and deviancy
found in an enforcement agency is a reflection of
values which are habitually practiced and ac-
cepted within that community. This was found to
be true in the present study.
The findings of this case study should not be in-
terpreted as applicable to all police departments
nor should it be a rationalization for the existence
of an illicit "code" anywhere. Rather, it is a very
limited effort to probe the very sensitive area of
"Blue-Coat Crime" and describe its operation and
method of perpetuation in one enforcement agency.
